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Abstract. In this paper, we propose and evaluate a method for using
σ-LFSRs with key-dependent feedback configurations (KDFC) in stream
ciphers. This method can be applied to any stream cipher that uses a
word-based LFSR. Here, a configuration generation algorithm uses the
secret key(K) and the initialization vector (IV) to generate a feedback
configuration. We have mathematically analysed the feedback configu-
rations generated by this method. As a test case, we have applied this
method on SNOW 2.0 and have analysed its impact on resistance to
algebraic attacks. Further, we have also tested the generated keystream
for randomness.
Keywords: Stream Cipher · σ-LFSR · Key-Dependent Feedback Con-
figuration · Primitive Polynomial · Algebraic Attack.
1 Introduction
Stream ciphers are used in a variety of applications [ANA16, PBC19]. LFSRs
(Linear Feedback Shift Register) are widely used as building blocks in stream
ciphers because of their simple construction and easy implementation.
Stream ciphers are vulnerable against algebraic attacks. For stream ciphers
built on LFSRs, the knowledge of the feedback equation of the LFSR is critical
for any algebraic attack. The generating polynomials (and hence the feedback
configuration) of the LFSRs are publicly known in most ciphers, and confiden-
tiality is provided only via secret initial values fed into LFSRs.
The literature in this area comes with a lot of research on algebraic attacks
[MPC04, Cou03, Dal06, KAAR17] as well as different approaches for improving
the algebraic resistance of stream ciphers (resistance against algebraic attacks)
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[AM09,SD11]. In this paper, we propose a solution for schemes like SNOW which
consist of a word based LFSR connected with a Finite State Machine (FSM).
We approach this problem making the feedback configuration of the σ-LFSR
dependent on the secret key. During initialization, the feedback configuration of
the σ-LFSR is assumed to be publicly known. The initial state of the σ-LFSR
is dependent on the secret key. With this configuration the scheme generates
a set of random numbers. These random numbers are then used to generate a
feedback configuration. The scheme is operated using this feedback configuration.
It is assumed that the random numbers generated during initialization are not
available to the attacker. In the rest of this paper, we refer to this method as
σ-KDFC (Key-Dependent Feedback Configuration).
The first novel aspect of the proposed approach is that the feedback con-
figuration of the σ-LFSR is key dependent. This increases the non-linearity of
the stream cipher and and improves its resistance against algebraic attacks. The
second novelty of a σ-KDFC is its flexibility in managing the trade-off between
algebraic resistance and computational complexity. The randomness of the cho-
sen configuration and the computational complexity of the configuration gener-
ation algorithm both increase with the number of iterations in the algorithm.
σ-KDFC provides the flexibility required to manage this trade-off via allowing
the designer to control the number of iterations.
We theoretically analyse the impact of σ-KDFC on algebraic resistance by
calculating the degree of the polynomials that relate the configuration of the
keystream generation module to the initial state of the σ-LFSR. Then, we study
the integration of σ-KDFC with SNOW 2.0 as a case study. We refer to the
resulting cipher stream as KDFC-SNOW. We use empirical tests to verify the
randomness of the keystream generated by KDFC-SNOW.
In this paper, we have considered Fpn as a finite field of pn elements over base
field Fp with charactersitic p, where p is a prime number. Fn2 is n-dimensional
vector space over base field F2. The ith row and jth column of a matrix M ∈ Fn×n
is denoted by M[i,:] and M[:,j] respectively. M [i, j] is considered as a coordinate
of matrix M . Minor of an entry in the ith row and jth column of matrix M is
expressed by µ(M [i, j]). Besides, ⊕ and + are used interchangeably to represent
addition over F2.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces LFSR, σ-
LFSR and some related concepts. Section 3 examines σ-KDFC, its components
and its time complexity. Section 4 presents the mathematical analysis on the
algebraic resistance of σ-KDFC. Section 5 discusses the case study as well as the
related evaluations. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Basic Concepts
A traditional LFSR of length b is a linear bit sequence generator usually im-
plemented using a shift register with b flip-flops and feedback loop containing
a few XOR gates. The XOR gates implement the GF(2) addition operation,
and serve to establishing a linear transformation characterized by a fixed gen-
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erating polynomial which represents the feedback configuration of the LFSR.
An LFSR generates a maximum-period sequence if its generating polynomial
is primitive [AG98]. The companion matrix of a primitive polynomial f(x) =
xb + cb−1xb−1 + cb−2xb−2 + · · ·+ c1x+ c0 wherein c0, c1, · · · , cb−1 ∈ F2 is given
in equation 1.
Pf =

0 0 0 · · · c0
1 0 0 · · · c1
0 1 0 · · · c2
...
...
... · · · ...
0 0 0 · · · cb−2
0 0 0 · · · cb−1

∈ Fb×b2 (1)
In addition to hardware implementation using XOR and XNOR gates [KGK19],
LFSRs can be implemented in software [KKT10,Lau07]. Moreover, multi-bit in-
put (parallel) LFSRs [?], multi-bit output (MBO) LFSRs [KKT10] have been
proposed in order to improve speed via increased parallelism.
Multi-bit input multi-bit output (MIMO) LFSRs are more evolved variants
of LFSRs wherein the ideas behind parallel and MBO LFSRs are combined [?].
MIMO LFSRs replace the scalar coefficients of the generating polynomial in
traditional LFSRs by vectors over the base field (GF(2) in this paper).
σ-LFSRs are special MIMO LFSRs in which the the coefficients of the gen-
erating polynomial are matrices over the base field. A σ-LFSR S is formally
defined as follows.
Definition 1. Consider B0, B1, · · · , Bb−1 ∈ Fm×m2 where b is a positive integer.
A σ-LFSR is a system with b, m-input m-output delay blocks D0, D1, · · · , Db−1
which satisfies the feedback equation Dt+1b−1 =
∑b−1
j=0Bj ×Dtj where Dtr represents
the content of Dr at time t. The polynomial fS(x) = xn+Bb−1xn−1+Bb−2xn−2+
· · ·+B0 is referred to as the generating σ-polynomial of S [ZHH07].
The σ-LFSR defined above is shown in figure 1.
Fig. 1. Block diagram of σ-LFSR
3
The matrices B0, B1, · · · , Bb−1 in definition 1 are referred to as the gain
matrices of S. The configuration matrix of S is defined accordingly as given by
equation 2.
CS =

0 I 0 · · · 0
0 0 I · · · 0
...
...
... · · · ...
0 0 0 · · · I
B0 B1 B2 · · · Bb−1
 ∈ Fmb×mb2 (2)
In equation 2, 0, I ∈ Fm×m2 are all-zero and identity matrices respectively. If
fS(x) is the generating σ-polynomial, then CS is referred to as its M -companion
matrix. The characteristic polynomial of this M -companion matrix is known as
the characteristic polynomial of the σ-LFSR.
Let Dti represent the output of the i
th delay block in S at timestamp t where
i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , b− 1}. The state vector of the σ-LFSR S at timestamp t (after the
tth clock cycle) is defined as follows.
V tS =

Dt0
Dt1
...
Dtb−1
 ∈ F
mb
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Further, the state transition equation of σ-LFSR is defined as follows.
V t+1S = CS × V tS (3)
Let D∞ represent the vector sequence (multisequence) generated by S. If
the period of D∞ is equal to 2mb − 1, the σ-LFSR S is called a primitive σ-
LFSR, and its σ-polynomial fS(x) is referred to as a primitive σ-polynomial.
The characteristic polynomial of such a σ-LFSR is a primitive element of F2[x].
We refer to this kind of companion matrices as M -companion matrices.
A conjecture on the total number of existing primitive σ-LFSRs over F2m
has been presented in [ZHH07] as given by equation 4.
NP =
|GL(m,F2)|
2m − 1 ×
φ(2mb − 1)
mb
× 2m(m−1)(b−1) (4)
In equation 4, GL(m,F2) is the general linear group of non-singular matrices
∈ Fm×m2 , and φ represents Euler’s totient.
This conjecture has been proved in [KP14]. Moreover, [KP14] gives an algo-
rithm for the enumeration of all |GL(m,F2)|2m−1 ×2m(m−1)(b−1) possible configuration
matrices for a given primitive polynomial.
3 σ-KDFC
Stream ciphers, like the SNOW series of ciphers, use word based LFSRs along
with an FSM module. The feedback configuration of the LFSR in such schemes
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is publicly known. This feedback relation is an integral part of most algebraic
attacks on such schemes [BG05] . The resistance of such schemes to algebraic at-
tacks could potentially increase if the feedback configuration is made key depen-
dent. The large number of primitive feedback configurations for σ-LFSRs makes
this possible. σ-KDFC is a key dependent mechanism of generating a primitive
feedback configuration for a σ-LFSR. Each time the secret key is changed the
feedback configuration of the σ-LFSR is updated. The first thing the method
needs to achieve this goal, is a key-dependent random number generation mod-
ule. Then a systematic mechanism is required to generate feedback configurations
for the σ-LFSR using these random numbers. Finally, a configurable keystream
generation module is required into which this σ-LFSR configuration can be de-
ployed. Figure 2 shows the schematic of a σ-KDFC and its interaction with the
host stream cipher.
Fig. 2. The Schematic of σ-KDFC
As shown in figure 2, a control line fed into a set of demultiplexers selects the
running phase of the system. For example, the initialization and operation phases
can be selected by setting PhaseSelect = 0 and PhaseSelect = 1 respectively.
During the initialization phase, the demultiplexers forward their inputs to the
configuration generation algorithm, which uses them as input random numbers.
In the operation phase, the demultiplexers provide the output keystream of the
modified cipher. The phases of σ-KDFC are explained in the following.
3.1 The Initialization Phase
The initialization phase comprises of three steps as explained below.
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Step 1: Random Number Generation In this step, the σ-LFSR has a pub-
licly known feedback configuration and is initialized using a secret key and an
Initialization Vector (IV) (as is normally done in word based stream ciphers like
SNOW). It collaborates with the FSM part of the host stream cipher to pro-
vide a set of random numbers. For a σ-LFSR with b, m-input m-output delay
blocks, mb −m random vectors are generated. These random vectors are used
to generate the feedback configuration of the σ-LFSR.
Step 2: Key-Based Configuration Generation This phase is performed by
an algorithm that uses the random vectors generated in the previous steps along
with the same number of primitive polynomials in order to create a random
configuration matrix in each invocation. These polynomials can be arbitrarily
chosen from existing lists of primitive polynomials [Zˇiv94].
At any iteration, the algorithm uses a higher-degree primitive polynomial,
and generates a matrix with an additional column until the number of columns
reaches n = m ∗ b. The primitive polynomial with the highest degree is the
characteristic polynomial of the final configuration matrix. The number of the
iterations in this algorithm is controlled by the number of input random vectors.
As the number of input random vectors increases, the randomness of the out-
put configuration matrix increases at the cost of a nonlinearly-increasing time
complexity. This trade-off can be resolved by controlling the number of random
vectors (runs of S).
The initialization algorithm generates a matrix Q which is in turn used to
generate an M -companion matrix by means of a similarity transformation.
Let P be the companion matrix of a primitive polynomial. Consider the
function SP defined in the following equation
SP : GL(n,F2)→ GL(n,F2) SP (Q) = Q× P ×Q−1 (5)
The function SP (Q) transforms the matrix Q into an M -companion matrix
with the same characteristic polynomial as P
The following result gives the structure of the matrix Q
Lemma 1. (Lemma 4.5 proven in [KP14]) Let P be the companion matrix of
a given irreducible polynomial f(x). Given an m−tuple N = (n1, n2, · · · , nm) ∈
Zm+ such that n1 + n2 + · · · + nm = n, the matrix P ∗ = Q × P ×Q−1 is in the
M -companion form if and only if Q is an invertible matrix of the form
Q = [en1 ; v1; v2; · · · : vm−1; en1P ; v1P ; · · · ; vm−1P ; · · · ; e1Pn1−1; v1Pn2−1; · · · ; vm−1Pnm−1]
, where v2, · · · , vm ∈ Fnq are row vectors and N = (n1, n2, · · · , nm) are such∑b
i=1 ni = n, e
n
1 =
 0︸︷︷︸
n−1 times
, 1
 ∈ Fn2 and vi ∈ Fn2 for i = 2, 3 · · · , n.
The configuration matrix is generated by algorithm 1. This algorithm is
proven in [KP14]. The input to this algorithm is the set of random vectors
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generated in the first step of the initialization process along with a list of ar-
bitrary primitive polynomials. These are used to generate the matrix Q which
is then acted upon by the function SP . The algorithm guarantees to create a
unique Q-matrix from each set of random vectors for a given set of primitive
polynomials [KP14].
Algorithm 1 Full Rank Matrix Y Generation Algorithm
Input:
1. A full rank matrix stored in M ∈ Fm×m2 .
2. A set of n − m primitive polynomials of degrees {m,m + 1, · · · , n} stored in an
array L. The corresponding companion matrices are represented by PL(i) for m ≤
i ≤ n. These polynomials can be arbitrarily selected from the lists of primitive
polynomials which are available in literature [Zˇiv94]
3. A set of random binary vectors Ri ∈ Fn2 , for i ∈ {0, · · · , n −m},( These are the
(n−m) random vectors generated in the first step of the initialization process)
Output: A full rank matrix Y ∈ Fm×n2 .
1: procedure Pillai(M,L,R)
2: Y ←M
3: d← Dimension(Y )
4: t← 0
5: while t ≤ (n−m) do
6: c← Y [t (mod m); ]
7: λ← Lin− solver(c, PL[t])
8: Y ← Y × λ
9: Y [:, d+ t− 1]← Rt
10: Y [c, d+ t− 2]← 0
11: Y [c, d+ t− 1]← 1
12: t← t+ 1
13: end while
14: Return Y
15: end procedure
Note that at every step, the size of c vector increases. Therefore the time
taken for each iteration of Algorithm 1 increases with each iteration. To circum-
vent this problem, a few of these iterations could be run offline in a server and
the resulting Y matrix could be made public. Let this matrix be denoted by
Yinit. The remaining iterations can be done during the initialization phase of
the keystream generator. When this is done, the variable Y in Algorithm 1 will
be initialized as Yinit, and the variable t will be initialized as k (mod m), where
k(m < k < n) is the number of iteration done offline. Further, the number of
random vectors generated in the first step will now be n−m− k. The array L
will contain primitive polynomials with degrees (m + k, . . . , n). The ’for’ loop
will run n−m− k times.
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Algorithm 2 Find the power of A, λ, such that c× λ = e1|c|
Input:
1. c ∈ F1×n2 .
2. A companion matrix A ∈ Fn×n2 .
Output: The power of A, λ, such that c× λ = e1|c|.
1: procedure Lin− solver(c, A)
2: X ←

c
c×A
c×A2
...
c×An−1
 ∈ Fn×n2
3: Solve the linear equation y ×X = en1 for y.
4: λ← y[0]× I + y[1]×X + · · ·+ y[n− 1]×Xn−1
5: Return λ
6: end procedure
In algorithm 1, λ = Lin− solver(c, PL[t]) is a matrix such that c× λ = e1|c|.
Algorithm 2 calculates λ by solving a linear equation.
Algorithm 3 Configuration matrix Generation
Input:
1. Companion matrix of a primitive polynomial of degree n, Pz.
2. Full rank matrix Y ∈ Fm×n2 generated from Algorithm 1.
Output: A random configuration matrix for S is stored in CS .
1: procedure FIND-CONFIG(Pz, Y )
2: Pz ← PL[n−m−1]
8
3: Q←

Y [0 :, ]
Y [1 :, ]
...
Y [m− 1 :, ]
Y [0 :, ]× Pz
Y [1 :, ]× Pz
...
Y [m− 1 :, ]× Pz
...
Y [0 :, ]× (Pz)b−1
Y [1 :, ]× (Pz)b−1
...
Y [m− 1 :, ]× (Pz)b−1

∈ Fn×n2
4: CS ← Q× Pz ×Q−1
5: Return CS
6: end procedure
Step 3: Configuration Deployment Algorithm 3 generates a configuration
matrix in the form of equation 2. The last m rows in the generated configuration
matrix contain the gain matrices B0 through Bb−1. The feedback gains of the
σ-LFSR are set as B0, B1, . . . , Bb−1.
3.2 An Analysis on the Initialization Phase
In this subsection, we analyse the time complexity of the initialization phase.
Then we discuss the flexibility of σ-KDFC, which makes it possible to manage
the tradeoff between the complexity and the algebraic resistance.
Configuration Generation Time Complexity Algorithm 2 is of time com-
plexity O(n3) as it uses Gaussian elimination of type LU(Lower-Upper Triangu-
lar) decomposition to solve the system of linear equations. On the other hand,
algorithm 1 calls algorithm 2 once in each of its n−m iterations. Thus, the time
complexity of algorithm 1 is of order O(n4).
Flexibility The structure of algorithm 1 allows for a trade-off between time
complexity on one hand and randomness and algebraic resistance on the other.
The total time taken to calculate the feedback configuration can be reduced
by increasing the number of iterations of Algorithm 1 done in the server. This
however reduces the number of possible configurations and hence compromises
on the randomness.
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3.3 The Operation Phase
In this phase, the σ-LFSR with the updated feedback configuration is used along
with the FSM to generated the keystream. Its configuration is updated by the
mentioned algorithm each time the secret key is changed. σ-KDFC does not
change the FSM part of the host stream cipher.
4 Algebraic Resistance Analysis
In this subsection, we analyse the complexity and algebraic resistance of σ-
KDFC.
4.1 Definitions
An n-variable Boolean function f is a map, f : Fn2 → F2. It can be written in
the Algebraic Normal Form (ANF) representation as follows [Car].
f = ⊕
I∈P (l)
aI
(∏
i∈I
xi
)
= ⊕
I∈P (n)
aIx
I (6)
where, P (n) denotes the power set of N = {1, ..., n} and f belongs to the ring
F2[x0, x1, . . . , xn−1]/ < x20+x0, x22+x2, . . . , x2n−1+xn−1 >. The algebraic degree
of the Boolean function f ,denoted by |f | is simply defined as {max|T ||aT 6= 0},
where |T | represents the cardinality of the set T .
Observe that the entries of the last m-rows of the configuration matrix CS ,
i.e. the entries of the Bis in Equation 2, are polynomials in the entries of the
matrix Y which is calculated in Algorithm 1. These entries are in turn related
to the initial state of the σ-LFSR which is unknown to the adversary. Therefore,
Bk(i,j) = fk(i,j)(U) (7)
where U represents the entries of the last m− 1 rows of the matrix Y (The first
row of Y is en1 ). The algebraic degree of CS is defined by equation 8.
Θ (CS) = max
k,i,j
(|fk(i,j)(U)|) (8)
In the rest of this paper, we simply use Θ instead of Θ (CS) to represent
the algebraic degree of CS . Θ can be considered as a measure of the algebraic
resistance of σ-KDFC. In the succeeding subsection we calculate a lower bound
for Θ.
4.2 Analysis
In this section we analyse the entries of the Bis, generated in the proposed
method, as boolean functions and give a lower bound on the maximum degree
of these functions. We begin our analyses making a few observations.
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Algorithm 1 generates a matrix Y ∈ Fm×n2 with first row en1 . Let the re-
maining rows of Y be v1, v2, . . . , vm−1. For 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1, let the entries of vi
be vi,1, vi,2, . . . , vi,n. These vi,js are functions of the initial state of the stream
cipher. In Algorithm 3, Y is in turn used to generate the following matrix .
Q =

en1
v1
v2
...
vm−1
en1Pz
v1Pz
...
vm−1Pz
...
e1P
b−1
z
v1P
b−1
z
...
vm−1P b−1z

(9)
where Pz is the companion matrix of a publicly known primitive characteristic
polynomial of the σ-LFSR. Finally, the configuration matrix CS is generated
by the formula CS = Q × Pz × Q−1. Since Q is an inevitable boolean matrix,
the determinant of Q is always 1. This results in Q−1 = Q(a) where Q(a) is the
adjugate of Q. Moreover, since the elements of Q belong to F2, the co-factors
are equal to minors of Q. The rows of Q can be permuted to get the following
matrix QP
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QP =

0 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0 1
0 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 1 ∗
...
... · · · ... ...
0 0 · · · 0 1 ∗ ∗
v1,1 v1,2 · · · v1,n−b v1,n−b+1 · · · v1,n−1 v1,n
v1,2 v1,3 · · · v1,n−b+1 v1,n−b+2 · · · v1,n ∗
...
... · · · ... ...
v1,b v1,b+1 · · · v1,n v1,n+1 · · · ∗ ∗
v2,1 v2,2 · · · v2,n−b v2,n−b+1 · · · v2,n−1 v2,n
v2,2 v2,3 · · · v2,n−b+1 v2,n−b+2 · · · v2,n ∗
...
... · · · ... ...
v2,b v2,b+1 · · · v2,n v2,n+1 · · · ∗ ∗
...
... · · · ... ...
vm−1,1 vm−1,2 · · · vm−1,n−b vm−1,n−b+1 · · · vm−1,n−1 vm−1,n
vm−1,2 vm−1,3 · · · vm−1,n−b+1 vm−1,n−b+2 · · · vm−1,n ∗
...
... · · · ... ...
vm−1,b vm−1,b+1 · · · vm−1,n vm−1,n+1 · · · ∗ ∗

∈ Fn×n2
(10)
,where ∗ denotes the linear combination of (vi,1, vi,2, · · · , vi,n). Note that Q−1
can be got by permuting the rows of Q−1P The matrix QP can be decomposed
into four sub-matrices:
– Q1 = [QP [i, j]|1 ≤ i ≤ b, 1 ≤ j ≤ n− b].
– Q2 = [QP [i, j]|1 ≤ i ≤ b, n− b+ 1 ≤ j ≤ n].
– Q3 = [QP [i, j]|b+ 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ n− b].
– Q4 = [QP [i, j]|b+ 1 ≤ i ≤ n, n− b+ 1 ≤ j ≤ n].
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These sub-matrices appear as follows:
QP =
Q1 =

0 0 · · · 0
0 0 · · · 0
...
... · · · ...
0 0 · · · 0

b×n−b
Q2 =

0 · · · 0 1
0 · · · 1 ∗
...
...
1 · · · ∗ ∗

b×b
Q3 =

v1,1 v1,2 · · · v1,n−b
v1,2 v1,3 · · · v1,n−b+1
...
... · · ·
v1,b v1,b+1 · · · v1,n
v2,1 v2,2 · · · v2,n−b
v2,2 v2,3 · · · v2,n−b+1
...
... · · · ...
v2,b v2,b+1 · · · v2,n
...
... · · · ...
vm−1,1 vm−1,2 · · · vm−1,n−b
vm−1,2 vm−1,3 · · · vm−1,n−b+1
...
... · · · ...
vm−1,b vm−1,b+1 · · · vm−1,n

n−b×n−b
Q4 =

v1,n−b+1 · · · v1,n−1 v1,n
v1,n−b+2 · · · v1,n ∗
...
... · · · ...
v1,n+1 · · · ∗ ∗
v2,n−b+1 · · · v2,n−1 v2,n
v2,n−b+2 · · · v2,n ∗
...
... · · · ...
v2,n+1 · · · ∗ ∗
...
... · · · ...
vm−1,n−b+1 · · · vm−1,n−1 vm−1,n
vm−1,n−b+2 · · · vm−1,n ∗
...
... · · · ...
v1,n+1 · · · ∗ ∗

n−b×b
(11)

Since QP is invertible, det(QP ) = det(Q3) = 1. We now proceed to analyse
some of the minors of QP in the following lemma.
Let us consider Γk is the set of of polynomial functions of U variables with
degree k.
Lemma 2. If i = b and 1 ≤ j ≤ (n− b), then µ(QP [i, j])) ∈ Γn−b
Proof. For two matrices A and B with the same number of rows, let [AB]p,q
represent the matrix which results from removing the pth column from A and
appending the qth column of B to A. For i = b and 1 ≤ j ≤ (n− b), µ(QP [i, j]))
is given by:
µ(QP [i, j]) = det([Q3Q4]j,1) (12)
Recall that for a binary matrix M ∈ Fn×n2 its determinant is given by the
following formula
det(M) =
∑
f∈§n
∏
1≤i≤n
M(i, f(i)) (13)
, where Sn is the set of permutations on (1, 2, . . . , n). Observe that the diago-
nal elements of ([Q3Q4])j,1 are distinct vi,ks. Their product corresponds to the
identity permutation in the determinant expansion formula for [Q3Q4])j,1. The
resultant monomial has degree n− b. Further, this monomial will not occur as a
result of any other permutation. Hence det([Q3Q4])j,1 is always a polynomial of
degree n− b.
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Lemma 3. If 1 ≤ i ≤ b then
µ(QP [i, j]) =
{
det(Q3) i+ j = n+ 1
0 i+ j >= n+ 1
(14)
Proof. Observe that, for 1 ≤ i ≤ b and i+ j = n+ 1, the QP [i, j]s are the anti-
diagonal elements of Q2. Clearly, the minors of these elements are all equal to
the determinant of Q3. As we have already seen the invertibility of QP implies
that this determinant is always 1. Therefore, µ(QP [i, j]) = 1 when i+ j = n+ 1
Note that, for 1 ≤ i ≤ b and i + j > n + 1, the QP [i, j]s are the elements
of Q2 that are below the anti-diagonal. Observe that if the row and column
corresponding to such an element are removed from QP then the first b− 1 rows
of the resulting matrix are always rank deficient. Therefore, the determinant of
this matrix is always 0. Therefore, µ(QP [i, j]) = 0.
Lemma 4. If b+ 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ n− b, then µ(QP [i, j]) ∈ Γn−b−1.
Proof. Observe that the elements of QP considered in this lemma are elements
of the sub-matrix Q3. Therefore, µ(QP [i, j]), for the range of i and j considered,
is nothing but the determinant of the sub-matrix of Q3 got by deleting the
ith row and jth column of Q3. The diagonal elements of such a sub-matrix
are distinct vi,js. Their product will result in a monomial of degree n − b −
1. This corresponds to the identity permutation in the determinant expansion
formula given by Equation 12. Observe that no other permutation generates this
monomial. Hence, the minor will always have a monomial of degree n − b − 1 .
Therefore, µ(QP [i, j] ∈ Γn−b−1.
Lemma 5. If b+ 1 ≤ i ≤ n and n− b+ 1 ≤ j ≤ n, then µ(QP [i, j]) = 0.
Proof. The elements of QP considered in this lemma are elements of the sub-
matrix Q4. Whenever the row and column corresponding to such an element is
removed from QP , the rows of the submatrix Q2 become linearly dependent.
Therefore, the first b rows of the resultant matrix are always rank deficient.
Consequently, µ(QP [i, j]) = 0.
For a given matrix A with polynomial entries, let Θ(A) be the maximum
degree among all the entries of A. As there are n − b rows in QP with variable
entries, Θ(Q−1P ) ≤ n − b. Therefore, we get the following as a consequence of
Lemma 2.
Θ(Q−1) = Θ(Q−1P ) = n− b (15)
Recall that the configuration matrix CS is given by QPZQ−1 where PZ is the
companion matrix of the characteristic polynomial of the σ-LFSR. We now use
the above developed machinary to calculate Θ(CS).
Theorem 1. Θ(CS) ≥ n− b .
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Proof. Observe that the gain matrices B0, B1 · · · , Bb−1 appear in the last m
rows of CS . These rows are generated by multiplying the last m rows QPZ with
Q−1. The last m rows of QPZ are as follows

0 0 · · · 1 ∗ · · · ∗ ∗
v1,b+1 v1,b+2 · · · v1,n ∗ · · · ∗ ∗
v2,b+1 v2,b+2 · · · v2,n ∗ · · · ∗ ∗
...
... · · · ... ... · · · ... ...
vm−1,b+1 vm−1,b+2 · · · vm−1,n ∗ · · · ∗ ∗
 ∈ Fb×n2 (16)
The element CS [n−m+ 1, n−m+ 1] is got by multiplying the (n−m+ 1)-th
row of QPZ with the (n−m+1)-th column of Q−1. Note that the (n−m+1)-th
column of Q−1 is equal to the b-th column of Q−1P . As a consequence of Lemmas
2 and 3, this column has the following form.
Q−1[:, n−m+ 1] = (P1, P2, · · · , Pn−b, 1, 0, · · · , 0)T (17)
where P1, P2, · · · , Pn−b ∈ Γ (n− b). Therefore,
CS [n− b+ 1, n− b+ 1] = ( 0, 0, · · · , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
(n−b) entries
, ∗, · · · , ∗, ∗)× (P1, P2, . . . , Pn−b, 1, 0, · · · , 0)T
= Pn−b
Hence, it is proved that Θ(CS) ≥ n− b.
Example 1. Consider a primitive σ−LFSR with 4, 2-input 2-output delay blocks
i.e. m = 2 and b = 4. Therefore n = mb = 8. The primitive polynomial for the
companion matrix Pz is f(x) = x
8+x4+x3+x2+1. The corresponding matrices
Q and QP have the following structure:
Q =

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x1 + x3 + x4 + x5
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x1 + x3 + x4 + x5 x2 + x4 + x5 + x6
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x1 + x3 + x4 + x5 x2 + x4 + x5 + x6 x3 + x5 + x6 + x7

(18)
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QP =
Q1 =

0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
 Q2 =

0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0

Q3 =

x1 x2 x3 x4
x2 x3 x4 x5
x3 x4 x5 x6
x4 x5 x6 x7
 Q4 =

x5 x6 x7 x8
x6 x7 x8 x1 + x3 + x4 + x5
x7 x8 x1 + x3 + x4 + x5 x2 + x4 + x5 + x6
x8 x1 + x3 + x4 + x5 x2 + x4 + x5 + x6 x3 + x5 + x6 + x7

(19)
The 4-th row of QP or the 7-th column of Q−1 is given by
Q−1[:, 7] = (P1, P2, P3, P4, 1, 0, 0, 0)
where
P1 : x2x4x6x8+x2x4x7+x2x5x8+x2x6+x3x6x8+x3x7+x4x5x6+x4x6+x4x8+x5.
P2 : x1x4x6x8 + x1x4x7 + x1x5x8 + x1x6 + x2x3x6x8 + x2x3x7 + x2x4x5x8 +
x2x4x6x7+x2x5x6+x2x5x7+x3x4x8+x3x5x6+x3x5x8+x3x6x7+x4x5+x4x7
P3 : x1x3x6x8 +x1x3x7 +x1x4x5x8 +x1x4x6x7 +x1x5x6 +x1x5x7 +x2x3x5x8 +
x2x3x6x7+x2x4x5x7+x2x4x6+x2x4x8+x2x5x6+x2x6x8+x2x7+x3x4x7+
x3x4x8 + x3x5x7 + x3x5 + x4x5 + x4x6
P4 : x1x3x5x8 +x1x3x6x7 +x1x4x5x7 +x1x4x6 +x1x4x8 +x1x5x6 +x2x3x5x7 +
x2x3x6 +x2x4x7 +x2x5x8 +x2x5 +x2x6x7 +x3x4x6 +x3x4x7 +x3x8 +x4x5
Here, CS [7, 7], is equal to P4 which is a polynomial of degree 4.
5 Case Study: Integration with SNOW 2.0
In this subsection, we first introduce SNOW 2.0, and then use it as a case study
to show how σ-KDFC can be applied to an LFSR-based cipher stream. We refer
to the resulting cipher as KDFC-SNOW.
5.1 SNOW 2.0:
The SNOW series of word based stream ciphers was first introduced in [EJ00].
This version of SNOW is known as SNOW 1.0. SNOW 1.0 was shown to be
vulnerable to linear distinguishing attack as well as guess and determine attack
[HJB09].
SNOW 2.0 (Adopted by ISO/IEC standard IS 18033-4) was introduced later
in [EJ02] as a modified version of SNOW 1.0. This version was shown to be
vulnerable to algebraic attacks [BG05]. We consider SNOW 2.0 as a test case
and demonstrate how replacing the LFSR in this scheme with a σ-LFSR increases
its resistance to algebraic attacks.
The block diagram of SNOW 2.0 is shown in figure 3.
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Fig. 3. The block diagram of SNOW 2.0
In figure 3, + and  represent the GF (2) addition operation (implemented
in hardware by XOR gates) and integer addition modulo 232 respectively. As
shown in figure 3, the keystream generator in SNOW 2.0 consists of an LFSR
and an FSM (Feedback State Machine). The generating polynomial of the word
based LFSR is given by:
FS(x) = (αx
16 + x14 + α−1x5 + 1) ∈ F232 [X] (20)
where, α is the root of the following primitive polynomial
GS(x) = (x
4 + β23x3 + β245x2 + β48x+ β239) ∈ F28 [X]
where β is the root of the following primitive polynomial.
HS(x) = x
8 + x7 + x5 + x3 + 1 ∈ F2[X]
The state transition equation of the LFSR in figure 3 is as follows:
Dt16 = α
−1Dt11 +D
t
2 + αD
t
0.
where Dti ∈ F232 is the value stored in the ith delay block at time t (after the tth
clock cycle).
The FSM contains two 32-bit registers R1 and R2. These registers are con-
nected by means of an S-Box which is made using four AES S-boxes. This S-box
serves as the source of nonlinearity.
5.2 KDFC-SNOW:
In the proposed modification, we replace the LFSR part of SNOW 2.0 by a σ-
LFSR having 16, 32-input 32 output delay blocks. The configuration matrix of
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the σ-LFSR is generated using Algorithms 1-3. We shall refer to the modified
scheme, shown in Figure 4, as KDFC-SNOW.
Fig. 4. The block diagram KDFC-SNOW
During initialization the configuration matrix of the σ-LFSR is publicly
known. This could correspond to the feedback configuration of the LFSR in
SNOW-2 where multiplication by finite field elements are expressed using suit-
able matrices. As in SNOW 2.0, the σ-LFSR is initialized using a 128-bit IV and
a 128/256-bit secret key K. KDFC-SNOW is run with this configuration for 32
clock cycles without producing any symbols at the output. The random numbers
thus generated are used in Algorithms 1-3 to generate a new feedback configura-
tion. This configuration replaces the original one and the resulting set-up is used
to generate the keystream. As we have already mentioned, some of the iterations
of Algorithm 1 could be precalculated and the remaining could be done as a part
of the initialization process. In the particular case that we have considered, it
is assumed that 468 iterations of Algorithm 1 are precalculated and the result,
Yinit ∈ F 32×5002 , is publicly known. The last 12 iterations of Algorithm 1 are
carried out as part of the initialization process.
5.3 Initialization of KDFC-SNOW
– The delay blocks D0, · · · , D15 are initialized using the 128/256 bit secret key
K and a 128 bit IV in exactly the same manner as SNOW 2.0. The registers
R1 and R2 are set to zero.
– The initial feedback configuration of the σ-LFSR is identical to SNOW 2.0.
This is done by setting B11 and B0 as matrices that represent multiplication
by α−1 and α respectively. Further, B2 is set to identity. The other gain
matrices are set to zero.
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– KDFC-SNOW is run in this configuration for 32 clock cycles without making
the output externally available. During this phase the feedback equation is
given as follows,
Dt+115 = B0D
t
0 +B1D
t
1 + · · ·+B15Dt15 + F t (21)
where F t is the output of the FSM at the t-th instant. The last 12 values of
F t are used as the random numbers in Algorithm 1.
– A new configuration matrix is calculated using Algorithms 1-3 and the cor-
responding feedback configuration replaces the original one.
5.4 Generation of Nonlinear Equation of KDFC-SNOW
We now discuss the equations that govern the working of KDFC-SNOW. The
outputs of the delay blocks of the σ-LFSR are related as per the following equa-
tion:
Dt+115 = B0D
t
0 +B1D
t
1 + · · ·+B15Dt15 (22)
where Dtk is the value of the k-th delay block at the t-th time instant. Note that
Dtk =
{
D0k+t 0 ≤ k + t ≤ 15
B0D
t
0 +B1D
t
1 + · · ·+B15Dt15 k + t > 15
(23)
The value of the keystream at the t-th time instant is given by the following
equation Let Ft be the output of the FSM at time t,
Ft = (D
t
15 Rt1) +Rt2 (24)
The registers are updated as follows:
Rt+11 = D
t
5 Rt2 (25)
Rt+12 = S(R
t
1) (26)
zt = Rt1 Dt15 +Rt2 +Dt0 = (Rt−12 Dt4)Dt15 +Rt2 +Dt0 (27)
where Rt1 and R
t
2 represent the values of registers R1 and R2 at time instant t.
The operation ”” is defined as follows:
x y = (x+ y) mod 232 (28)
The challenge for an adversary in this scheme is to find the gain matrices
{B0, B1, · · · , B15} in addition to the initial state ({D00, · · · , D015}).
Note that Equations 24 to 27 are got from the FSM. Since the FSM part
of the keystream generator is identical for SNOW 2.0 and KDFC-SNOW these
equations are identical for both schemes.
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5.5 Security enhancement due to KDFC-SNOW
We first briefly the Algebraic attack on SNOW 2 described in [BG05] and demon-
strate why this attack becomes difficult with KDFC-SNOW. This attack first
attempts to break a modified version of the scheme where the  operator is
approximated by ⊕. The state of LFSR and the value of the registers at the end
of the 32 initialization cycles are considered unknown variables. This accounts
for a total of 512 + 32 = 544 unknown variables. The algebraic degree of each
of the S-box(S) equations (156 linearly independent quadratic equations in each
clock cycle ) is 2. Rearranging the terms in Equation 27, we get the following
Rt2 = (R
t−1
2 Dt4)Dt15 +Dt0 + zt. (29)
Note that R01 = R
0
2 + z
0 + D00 + D
0
15.Therefore, by approximating  as ⊕,
Equation 29 expands to the following:
Rt2 = R
0
2 +
t∑
i=0
zi +
t∑
i=0
(Di4 +D
i
15 +D
i
0) (30)
Further Equation 26 can be expanded as follows:
Rt+12 = S(R
t
1) = S(R
t
2 + z
t +Dt15 +D
t
0) (31)
In equation 31, the outputs of the delay blocks can be related to the initial state
of the LFSR using equation 23. Because of the nature of the S-Box, Equation
31 gives rise to 156 quadratic equations per time instant ( [BG05]). When these
equations are linearized, the number of variables increases to
∑2
i=0
(
544
i
) ≈ 217.
Therefore with 217/156 ≈ 951 samples, we get a system of equations, which
can be solved in O(251) time, to obtain the initial state of the LFSR and the
registers. This attack is then modified to consider the  operator. This attack
has a time complexity of approximately O(2294).
When the LFSR in SNOW 2.0 is replaced by a σ-LFSR, the feedback equation
is no longer known. If the entries of the feedback gain matrices are considered
as unknowns, then there are a total of 16 ∗ m2 + mb + m = 16928 unknown
variables. The output of the delay blocks at a given instant are functions of these
variables. The degree of these functions increase with each time instant till the
degree reaches 16m2+n = 16896. Therefore, the equations that are generated by
Equation 31 are no longer quadratic in the set of all unknowns. These equations
have a significantly higher degree and higher number of unknowns. Therefore,
solving these equations using linearization is not feasible.
One could instead consider the rows of the matrix Y generated by Algorithm
1 as unknowns. Assuming that the first row is en1 , the total number of unknowns
will now be 31 ∗ 512 = 15872. As we have already seen, the entries of the feed-
back matrices (Bis) are polynomials in these variables. From Theorem 1, the
maximum degree of these polynomials is atleast n− b. Therefore, the maximum
degree of the equations generated by Equation 31 will be atleast n−b+1 = 497.
Therefore, linearizing this system of equations gives rise to a system of linear
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equations in N =
∑497
i=0
(
16416
i
) ≈ O(23207) unknowns. Therefore, an algebraic
attack on this scheme that uses linearization seems unfeasible.
Further, the feedback equation of the LFSR is central to known Guess and
Determine attacks on SNOW 2.0 ( [AE09])( [NP14]). Since this equation is not
known apriori in KDFC-SNOW, launching such attacks is much more difficult.
5.6 Randomness Test
In this subsection, we evaluate the randomness of the keystream generated by
KDFC-SNOW.
Test Methodology
We have used the NIST randomness test suite to evaluate the randomness of
a keystream generated by KDFC-SNOW.There are are 16 randomness tests in
the suite. Each test returns a level of significance i.e. P − V alue. If this value is
above 0.01 for a given test, then the keystream is considered to be random for
that test.
KDFC-SNOW has been implemented using SageMath 8.0. The NIST ran-
domness tests have been conducted on the generated keystream using Python
3.6. The characterestic polynomial of the σ-LFSR has been taken as f(x) =
x512 +x510 +x504 +x502 +x501 +x494 +x493 +x490 +x486 +x485 +x483 +x481 +
x480 +x478 +x477 +x471 +x470 +x469 +x466 +x462 +x461 +x459 +x458 +x452 +
x449+x446+x445+x444+x441+x438+x437+x434+x433+x432+x431+x429+x427+
x424+x423+x420+x419+x414+x412+x411+x409+x405+x402+x400+x399+x398+
x396+x395+x393+x392+x390+x388+x387+x385+x375+x374+x372+x371+x366+
x365+x363+x362+x359+x357+x356+x355+x354+x353+x352+x351+x350+x347+
x345+x344+x343+x341+x339+x338+x337+x336+x333+x330+x329+x326+x324+
x322+x319+x310+x307+x306+x305+x304+x303+x301+x299+x298+x297+x296+
x295+x294+x293+x292+x291+x289+x286+x285+x283+x282+x281+x278+x276+
x274+x271+x269+x264+x262+x259+x258+x257+x255+x253+x251+x249+x248+
x243+x240+x239+x238+x236+x235+x233+x232+x230+x229+x228+x227+x226+
x222+x217+x216+x215+x214+x213+x210+x208+x206+x203+x201+x199+x193+
x190+x184+x179+x178+x177+x175+x174+x173+x172+x171+x169+x165+x164+
x163+x158+x156+x155+x153+x152+x151+x149+x147+x146+x143+x141+x138+
x136+x132+x131+x129+x128+x126+x125+x124+x123+x121+x120+x119+x118+
x117+x116+x115+x113+x112+x111+x109+x105+x104+x103+x102+x98+x97+
x94+x93+x89+x88+x87+x81+x78+x76+x75+x73+x72+x70+x69+x68+x67+
x66+x65+x63+x59+x58+x57+x56+x55+x53+x51+x50+x49+x47+x46+x45+
x44 +x41 +x39 +x37 +x36 +x33 +x30 +x26 +x25 +x21 +x20 +x19 +x16 +x5 +1.
(This polynomial is the characteristic polynomial of the LFSR in SNOW 2.0
when it is implemented as a σ-LFSR i.e. when multiplication by α and α−1 are
represented by matrices).
The keystream has been generated using the following key (K) and initial-
ization vector (IV).
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K = [681, 884, 35, 345, 203, 50, 912, 358]IV = [645, 473, 798, 506] (32)
Test Results
The results obtained from 14 NIST tests are shown in table 1.
Number Test P-Value Random
01. Frequency Test (Monobit) 0.35966689490586123 X
02. Frequency Test within a Block 0.24374184001729746 X
03. Run Test 0.9038184342313019 X
04. Longest Run of Ones in a Block 0.5246846287441829 X
05. Binary Matrix Rank Test 0.1371167998339736 X
06. Discrete Fourier Transform (Spectral) Test 0.1371167998339736 X
07. Non-Overlapping Template Matching Test 0.3189818228443801 X
08. Overlapping Template Matching Test 0.211350493609367 X
09. Maurer’s Universal Statistical test 0.4521082097311434 X
10. Linear Complexity Test 0.1647939201114819 X
11. Serial Test 0.7821664366290292 X
12. Approximate Entropy Test 0.880218270580662 X
13. Cummulative Sums (Forward) Test 0.34630799549695923 X
14. Cummulative Sums (Reverse) Test 0.6633686090204551 X
Table 1. NIST Randomness Test
The results obtained for the Random Excursions Test are shown in table 2.
State CHI SQUARED P-Value Random
-4 9.375081555789523 0.09500667227464867 X
-3 .9066918454935624 0.969735280059932 X
-2 3.196312192020347 0.6697497097941535 X
-1 5.343347639484978 0.3754291967984828 X
1 5.446351931330472 0.363864453873992 X
2 6.937635775976262 0.22531988887331122 X
3 13.843145064377687 0.016637085511558194 X
4 3.790226890440857 0.5799959469559587 X
Table 2. 15. Random Excursions Test
Table 3 shows the results for the 16th test i.e. the Random Excursions Variant
Test
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State Count P-Value Random State Count P-Value Random
’-9.0’ 270 0.11944065987006025 X ’+1.0’ 467 0.9738690952237389 X
’-8.0’ 307 0.1787039957218327 X ’+2.0’ 488 0.6773674079894312 X
’-7.0’ 359 0.3310083710716354 X ’+3.0’ 470 0.9532739974827851 X
’-6.0’ 389 0.44696915370831947 X ’+4.0’ 416 0.5358953455898371 X
’-5.0’ 418 0.6002107789999439 X ’+5.0’ 386 0.3823929438406025 X
’-4.0’ 426 0.6204409395957975 X ’+6.0’ 397 0.495576078534262 X
’-3.0’ 439 0.6924575808023399 X ’+7.0’ 430 0.7436251044167517 X
’-2.0’ 486 0.7052562223122887 X ’+8.0’ 454 0.9191606777606087 X
’-1.0’ 486 0.512389348919496 X ’+9.0’ 481 0.9051424340008056 X
Table 3. Randomness Excursions Variant Test
These results are comparable to that of SNOW 2.0. Note that the feedback
configuration of SNOW 2.0 is one of the possible feedback configurations in the
σ-KDFC scheme.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have described a method of using σ-LFSRs with key depen-
dent feedback configurations in stream ciphers that use word based LFSRs. In
this method, an iterative configuration generation algorithm(CGA) uses key-
dependant random numbers to generate a random feedback configuration for
the σ-LFSR. We have theoretically analysed the algebraic degree of the result-
ing feedback configuration As a test case, we have demonstrated how this scheme
can be applied to SNOW 2.0. We have shown that the resulting keystream gen-
erator is resistant to algebraic attacks that have been launched against SNOW
2.0. Further, the keytreams generated by the proposed method are comparable
to SNOW 2.0 from a randomness point of view.
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